From the new version of March of the
Titans, just released:
WHITE SOUTH AFRICA’S NUCLEAR
BOMBS—SYMBOLIZES TECHNOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENT AND FAILURE OF APARTHEID
Possibly the greatest display of
white-ruled South Africa’s technological capability came with its development
of nuclear weapons.
The casings for South Africa’s nuclear
weapons, photographed at the Advena facility, near Pelindaba. Six weapons were
completed, and a seventh was under construction when the project was halted.
White South Africa built six atom bombs by
1989 at the Pelindaba nuclear research facility which was to the west of
Pretoria.
In 1989, the ruling National Party decided
to hand power to black majority rule, but did not wish to see the weapons
handed over to either a black government or one of the African National
Congresses’ allies such as Libya.
The weapons storage safe, buried deep
underground, at the Advena facilty near Pelindaba outside Pretoria. These were
the weapon storage lockers used for holding the assembled nuclear weapons.
The nuclear weapons project serves as
testament to two important facts about white South Africa.
Firstly, it is yet another proof, if any
was needed, of the falsity of the “environmental” theory of development. South
Africa did not develop nuclear technology “just because” of its geographic
location.
The development was possible because of the
race of the people who lived there, and had nothing to do with the geography,
climate, or any other factor.
Secondly, the fact that white South Africa
developed these weapons for supposed use against its enemies, shows the
delusion under which the apartheid leaders lived.
The policy of apartheid guaranteed that
white South Africa would inevitably be overrun with blacks, and the possibility
of using these weapons in any operational theater was, therefore, nonexistent.
White South Africa’s reliance on black
labor meant that no matter where such a weapon might be aimed, whites and
blacks alike would be targeted.
The nuclear weapons project stands as a
tribute to Afrikaner technological and scientific ability, but was an exercise
in political self-delusion, just like apartheid.”
=================
Additional information, not in the book,
but which might be of interest to readers:
- The South African nuclear weapons project
was publicly acknowledged in March 1993 by then state president F.W. de Klerk.
It was only announced after the weaponry had been fully dismantled and the core
elements destroyed or removed.
- The United States supplied South Africa
with its first supply of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) for use at the Safari-1
research reactor, commissioned in 1965 at Pelindaba. The US supplied South
Africa with about 100 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium fuel until 1975, when
anti-Apartheid sanctions stopped the shipments.
- Apartheid South Africa then turned to
Israel for further assistance with its nuclear weapons programme. It is still a
matter of debate as to how much technology Israel supplied, but it was probably
limited to tools rather than actual weaponry.
- South Africa stated its own HEU
enrichment program in a small warehouse in central Pretoria. As it became more
sophisticated, larger premises and stricter security were needed, and in the
mid-1960s, the project was moved to Pelindaba.
- At the same time, South Africa started
developing commercial applications for nuclear power plants, and in 1976,
construction was started on the Koeberg nuclear power station to the north of
Cape Town. Apart from providing electricity, Koeberg provided plausible
deniability for the Pelindada research station.
- In 1970, the South African government
announced that it was building the “Y-Plant at Valindaba,” located next door to
Pelindaba. The Y-Plant was commissioned in 1974 and started producing HEU in
1978.
- In 1977, South Africa’s Atomic Energy
Board (AEB) produced a first full-scale gun-type nuclear device prototype (as
opposed to a just a ballistic test device) without an HEU core. This 3 ton
bomb, was only meant to demonstrate feasibility of the weapon, and never for
actual use.
- In 1973, a group of scientists working at
the Sonchem facility in Somerset West, produced the mechanical subsystems for a
gun-type nuclear device. They successfully tested their design in May 1974,
which proved that a nuclear explosive was feasible.
- The Sonchem success convinced the AEB to
upgrade the Pelindaba facility, and by 1977, had constructed a facility in
“Building 5000,” and the Sonchem team was transferred to the Pretoria area. In
this building, the gun-type device was successfully test-fired using a natural
uranium projectile in 1976.
- Several other buildings at Pelindaba were
then created for other parts of the weapons project:
-
Building 5000 contained a pulse reactor for the experimental verification of
theoretical computer models. In 1979, the reactor was used as a fast critical
assembly in an experiment often referred to as "tickling the tail of the
dragon" that proved the design of the gun-type device. The reactor was
never again used as a pulse reactor and the facility was shut down in the early
1980s.
Building 5000 at Pelindaba, where the "Melba" device was given its "dry run."
-
Building 5100 contained the control room for Building 5000, offices, research
and development laboratories and machining facilities for uranium, particularly
buildings 5100 and 5200.
- Building
5200 housed a critical facility to verify separately the multiplication factors
of the two parts of a nuclear explosive device, providing confidence that the
gun-type design would work. The first nuclear explosive device was also
assembled in this building in 1979.
-
Building 5300 was designed exclusively as a laboratory for high explosives.
Small quantities of high explosives were pressed and machined into shapes at
this facility.
- By 1977, two test shafts (216 and 385
meters deep) had been drilled at the Vastrap military based outside Upington in
the northern Cape’s Kalahari Desert, with the intention of conducting an
“instrumented cold test” of the first prototype, using a depleted uranium core.
This would have entailed a “dry run” for a real nuclear test. The test date was
set for August 1977.
The corrugated iron shed which covers the two test shafts at the Vastrap military base north of Upington. The shed was built in 1987 when Armscor considered reopening the shafts for tests after they had been abandoned ten years earlier following an international outcry.
- The US government was officially — and
secretly — informed of the plans to conduct the test. The American government
urged the South Africans not to conduct the test, but (allegedly) kept the information
to themselves.
- The test plans were only abandoned when a
Soviet spy satellite detected the preparations and the Soviets notified the US
of the discovery. The US was forced to bring diplomatic pressure to bear as
news of the project spread, with the French government threatening to cancel
the contract for the Koeberg reactor (which was based upon French designs).
- The Vastrap test site was abandoned, only
to be opened again in 1987 when the test shafts were inspected and a corrugated
iron shed built over the holes. The test shafts were publicly filled in with
concrete in July 1993.
The Vastrap test shafts were filled in with concrete in 1993 under IAEA supervision.
- By 1979, the Y-Plant had produced 55
kilograms of HEU (at 80% enrichment) which was made into a core for a second
experimental device named “Melba.” This device was completed in 1980, and
used in a “zero-yield test” (in which a nuclear chain reaction is initiated
with negligible energy output). “Melba” was then stored in an
abandoned coal mine at Witbank at a former military ammunitions depot, until it
was moved to the Kentron “Circle” building near Pelindaba.
- By 1979, the state run arms manufacturer,
Armscor, was handed control of the project to develop full-blown nuclear
devices, with the AEB (now renamed the Atomic Energy Corporation or AEC)
providing nuclear materials and development work.
- Armscor built a new facility, the Kentron
Circle facility some 15 kilometers east of Pelindaba. The site, later renamed
Advena, was commissioned in May 1981.
A side view of the storage facility at the
Kentron Circle building, taken when the facility was still in use.
- At the Circle (“Advena”), Armscor
extended the nuclear weapons programme from the gun-type weapons to
inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) systems, and developed
advanced warhead designs.
- It was at Advena that cooperation with
Israel reached its zenith. Scientists from both countries worked on at least
two missiles, codenamed RSA-3 and RSA-4 (RSA= “Republic of South Africa”), both
developed from Israel’s Jericho II ICBM. One of the RSA-3 missiles, meant for
satellite launch, is today on display at the Swatkorps Air Force museum. The
RSA-4 missile could, allegedly, reach any target within a 7,000 kilometer
radius while carrying a 700 kilogram nuclear warhead.
The RSA-3 missile, as can be seen at the
Swartkops Air Force base museum. According to published data one of the
missiles, the RSA-4, would have been capable of delivering a 700 kg nuclear
warhead from its South African launch site to any point on earth. The RSA range
of missiles were built around the same engines that power Israel's Jericho-II
missile and its "Shavit" space launcher. South Africa ended its missile
collaboration with Israel in 1992 and then halted all ballistic missile
development in mid-1993.
- The first floor of the Circle building
had conventional workshops for making mechanical and electrical equipment;
storage rooms; uranium casting and machining workshops; a large vault;
integration rooms where portions of the devices were assembled; and eight
"cells" for testing internal ballistics, propellants, igniters, and
small quantities of high explosives for self-destruct mechanisms.
- An explosive test chamber located in one
of the cells could handle up to 2.5 kilograms of high explosive. It was also
used to conduct plane-wave experiments with shaped charges and to develop
high-speed instrumentation for preliminary work on implosion designs. Another
cell contained the "pig sty," a wood enclosure where projectile tests
were done for the gun-type device.
- The designers put a "plenum" or
large room above these cells. In an accident, this room would serve to
dissipate the overpressure from an explosion, preventing the collapse of the
roof or the walls. Holes at one end of the room would allow the explosion to
vent. From the outside, the holes were disguised as ventilation ducts.
- In the early 1980s, the program employed
about 100 people, of which only about 40 were directly involved in the weapons
program and only 20 actually built the devices. By the time the program was
canceled in 1989, the work force had risen to 300, with about half directly
involved in weapons work.
A more general view of the Kentron Circle
building, taken several years after the facility was closed down. It is empty
today.
- The weapons storage facility at Advena
consisted of a high-security vault with many smaller vaults inside. Each
nuclear device was divided into two sections, a front and back. With the HEU
distributed between the two halves, the design minimised the possibility of accidental
detonation or unauthorised use.
- A front and back end of a device were
never worked on simultaneously. Both ends could leave the vault at the same
time only after three top ministers and the head of government inserted their
separate sections of the code into the vault. No one person had the complete
code.
- - The total mass of a completed device
was about one metric ton. It had a diameter of nearly 65 centimeters and was
about 1.8 meters long. Each device contained an estimated 55 kilograms of HEU.
- In the mid-1980s, construction was
started on a new facility, Advena Central Laboratories, close to the Circle
building. This facility was intended to expand nuclear delivery options to
ballistic missiles. Construction was completed just as the nuclear program was
terminated.
The
Advena Central Laboratories, as they can be seen today. Commissioned to develop
the nuclear ICBMs and other advanced weaponry, the facility was completed just
as the nuclear weapons project was closed down.
- The Circle building, and planned new
facility, were closed down when the weapons project was abandoned. By September
6, 1991 all of the HEU had been removed from the weapons, melted down, and sent
back to the AEC for storage.
- Destruction of the major non-nuclear
components of the weapons, detailed design drawings, and photos of components
was completed by the end of 1992.
The
redacted part is most likely “to Israel” as there would be no other logical
recipient of such material.
1 comment:
This is an authoritative analysis of the neglected story of the South African bomb - yet it is one that holds important lessons for students of global nuclear disarmament.
South Africa was the only state that voluntarily liquidated its nuclear capacity, which might have been Pretoria's lasting legacy to world peace.
The West should use this model to ensure that Pakistan relinquishes its nuclear arsenal. A precondition of this should be bilateral disarmament between India and Pakistan. This may be ensured by : (a) ending all aid to the sub-continent until both disarm (b) imposing a trade embargo on both states (c) withholding assistance to Pakistan in resettling its unwanted migrants from Britain and the West (d) imposing a sterile contaminated 'death strip' on the Afghan border with Pakistan.
Thereafter, once the Iranian bomb has been neutralised, the Israelis will be compelled to disarm their nukes.
China must be drawn into the U.S./Russian Federation nuclear disarmament programme.
I disagree with the author's comments on the futility of the South African nuclear deterrent.
This was adopted (with U.S. connivance) as a means of deterring the 'frontline states' from any invasion of the Republic.
NATO invested heavily in the strategic defence of the Cape seaway with the secret Silver Mountain intelligence complex south of Cape Town and the provision of submarines and maritime patrol aircraft for the S.A. Defence Force.
The 'constellation of autonmous' Bantu statelets, providing a migratory workforce, was the underlying rationale of the separate development constitution.
There was, of course, no intention of deploying nuclear weapons within South Africa itself.
The criticism of European settlers in southern Africa relying on a 'benign helotry' does, I believe, ignore historical realities.
There was, if the sub continent was to be opened up to trade, agriculture, mining and commerce, simply no alternative to imposing European minority rule.
The Germans tried extermination in Sud West Afrika against the Hereros, but a Christianised (and the ubiquitous missionaries exerted undue pressure on colonial and imperial governments) settler population had no other choice but to rule fairly and attempt to 'civilise' the indigenous with public works, health care and rudimentary education.
That this meant that the Bantu population of Rhodesia soared from a quarter of a million in 1890 to 16 million in 1990 is just unfortunate.
Europeans had actually arrived in the Cape before the Bantu. Had the Cape Colony remained in Dutch, Afrikaaner hands, just possibly, the Bantu tribes could have been pushed north of the Limpopo - and, under a more ruthless Rhodes, farther north of the Zambezi.
The forces of nature also militated against substantial European settlement in southern Africa as the tradewinds, and the inhospitable eastern Cape/Natal coastline, meant it was easier to colonise the Antipodes than the sub continent.
Possibly the hardy Boers, energised by large families, could have farmed the Transvaal and the Free State without reliance on Bantu labour - but the goldfields and rapid undustrialisation demanded manual labour from the tribal lands.
Ironically, it was the very ideology of racial supremacy that many young South Africans and Rhodesian fought against in the Second War, that was, in hindsight, the only way that European civilisation could have been sustained in southern Africa
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